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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 8 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ELDER, GREG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
! BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
: Case No. 920260-CA 
: Judge 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal taken from the final order or denial of 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea to the charge of 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony, and 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, by the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge of the Second Judicial District 
Court. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Crim. Proc. Ann. R. 26 (12) (1989) and Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (1953 as amended), whereby the 
1 
defendant in a district court criminal action may take an appeal to 
the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any 
crime other than a first degree or capital felony, 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Was Appellant informed by the trial court of his right to 
conflict free representation? 
B. Did Appellant's attorney represent him with an actual 
conflict of interest? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Distribution of a Controlled 
substance in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Title 58-37-8 
(1) (a) (2) (i) (as amended 1953) and Possession of a Controlled 
Substance in violation of Utah Code Annotated Title 58-37-
8(1)(a)(14) (as amended 1953)- Appellant's co-defendant, Phillip 
Weaver, was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, At 
the time of initial presentment, the Circuit Court appointed 
Stephen Oda, a Davis County public defender, to represent both 
Appellant and his co-defendant. Shortly thereafter Michael Murphy, 
also a Davis County public defender, took over the representation 
of Appellant and his co-defendant from Mr. Oda. Appellant was 
arraigned in the Second Judicial District Court before the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on July 16, 1991. 
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On January 9, 1992, the date in which the case was 
scheduled for jury trial, Appellant, entered a negotiated plea of 
guilty to Count I, a second degree felony, and guilty to Count II, 
a third degree felony. The trial court found that the guilty plea 
entered was voluntary, knowing and understanding. (T. 10) . 
Appellant's co-defendant also entered a guilty plea to Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, at that date. (T. 
62) . 
Although a jury trial was scheduled for the case on 
January 9, 1992, and a jury was in fact convened to hear the case, 
no witnesses were subpoenaed to appear on behalf of the defense. 
(T. 78). 
Almost immediately after the guilty plea was entered, 
Appellant retained private counsel, Nick Porterfield, his current 
counsel of record, in order to withdraw the plea. A hearing on the 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea was held before the Honorable 
Douglas Cornaby on March 18, 1992. Conflicting testimony was given 
by Appellant and his previous counsel, Mr. Murphy, as to the 
discussions which took place concerning Mr. Murphy's potential 
conflict of interest in representing both Mr. Elder and his co-
defendant Mr. Weaver. There was also conflicting testimony as to 
the times and extent of discussions between Mr. Elder and Mr. 
Murphy regarding strategy for defense, the possibility of either 
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defendant turning state's witness, and the decision to enter a 
guilty plea. 
At the Hearing on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 
Appellant maintained that Mr. Murphy never informed him of any 
potential conflicts arising from the joint representation of both 
him and his co-defendant, Mr. Weaver. Appellant also contended 
that he was not asked if he were willing to waive his right to 
conflict free representation. (T. 13). 
At the same Hearing, Mr. Murphy testified that he 
"probably discussed if there was any conflict between their 
testimony". (T. 85) He also stated he was never faced with 
antagonistic defenses from the two co-defendants, nor was he ever 
in a position in which he favored one over the other. (T. 86) 
The Honorable Douglas Cornaby found that "there was the 
matter of conflict of interest between the two cases discussed" (T. 
131) and that although "it could have been a potential conflict 
there, both agreed that Mr. Murphy could go ahead and represent 
them." (T. 132) 
The trial judge also stated that since no issue of 
conflict was raised at the trial, "The Court had no duty to 
positively look into the matter." (T. 135). The trial court also 
found that there was no actual conflict, and therefore the motion 
to withdraw the guilty plea was denied. (T. 135). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's guilty plea to Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance and Possession of a Controlled Substance, second and 
third degree felonies, respectively, was not knowing, intelligent 
or voluntary. The plea was also entered into without benefit of 
competent legal counsel free from conflict of interest in violation 
of The United States Constitution, Sixth Amendment. 
Judge Cornaby abused his discretion in failing to grant 
the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
POINT I 
JUDGE CORNABY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA TO POSSESSION AND DISTRIBUTION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
It is well established that a knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary plea of guilty that admits each element of the offense 
and has the same effect and weight as if the defendant had been 
found guilty at trial by a jury of his peers. Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238 (1969); State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987). 
Since the entry of a guilty plea is accomplished without a review 
of the evidence as would be had in trial and because it involves a 
waiver of substantial constitutional rights, the Court has been 
granted statutory authority to review the facts surrounding the 
entry of the plea and, if appropriate, can upon a showing of good 
cause permit defendant to withdraw his previously entered guilty 
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plea. Section 77-13-6 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) provides, 
in pertinent part: 
A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon good cause shown and with leave of the court. 
Withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a privilege and not a right. 
State v. Hansen, 627 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1981). The granting of a 
motion to withdraw is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. State v. Bennett, 657 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1983). Reversal of 
a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea occurs only when "it 
clearly appears the trial court has abused its discretion by 
failing to find good cause. State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 6 
(Utah App. 1990) State v. Mildenhall, 747 P. 2d 422, 424 (Utah 
1987); State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Judge Cornaby failed to find good cause for withdrawing 
the guilty plea, stating that "The Court had no duty to positively 
look into the matter [of conflicted representation]". (T. 135). 
This however, is simply not an accurate statement of the law. 
The issue of "whether a state trial judge must inquire 
into the propriety of multiple representation even though no party 
lodges an objection" was addressed by the United States Supreme 
Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345 (1980). The Court's 
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holding on the issue was: "Unless the trial court knows or 
reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the 
court need not initiate an inquiry. Id. at 347 (emphasis added). 
See also State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah App. 1990). 
It is well settled that "The sixth amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel includes the right to counsel free 
from conflicts of interest. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 
1990) citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
A court must "take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk [of 
a conflict is] too remote to warrant separate counsel." Holloway 
v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978). " Trial courts presented 
with a possible conflict have an affirmative duty to protect a 
defendant's rights," U.S. v. Allen, 831 F.2d 1487,1494 (9th Cir. 
1987), citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 72 (1942), 
"which duty arises when the possibility of conflict is 'brought 
home to the court.7" Allen at 1494, citing Holloway at 485. "In 
every case of joint representation, if the court 'knows or 
reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists' it must 
initiate an inquiry about that conflict". Allen at 1494, citing 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347. 
In the present case, it is clear that Judge Cornaby knew 
or should have known that a conflict existed from Mr. Murphy 
representing both the Appellant, Mr. Elder, and his co-defendant, 
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Mr. Weaver. First of all, Judge Cornaby stated at the Hearing on 
the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea that: "[it] does make quite 
a difference between a third degree felony [Mr. Weaver's charge] 
and two second degree felonies that Mr. Elder was charged with, it 
could have been a potential conflict there, ..." (T. 132). This 
statement proves that the very nature of the case, in which 
Appellant's co-defendant was charged with a substantially lesser 
offense, "brought home" to the court the possibility of conflicts 
of interest. Plausible alternative strategies, including plea 
bargaining in exchange for one co-defendant's testimony against the 
other, or shifting the blame toward one in an effort to exonerate 
another, could not be pursued without adversely affecting one of 
the co-defendants. 
This scenario would tend to show that Appellant's co-
defendant, Mr. Weaver, was actually prejudiced more by this 
conflict than Appellant himself: 
But degree of harm is irrelevant for purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment. As long as an actual 
conflict of interest has adversely affected 
the lawyer's representation of his client, 
then it doesn't matter whether one client was 
harmed more than another—especially since 
prejudice is assumed and need not be 
established independently. 
United States Ex Rel., Zembowski v. DeRobertis, 771 F.2d 1057 
(7th Cir. App. 1985). 
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Because Judge Cornaby knew or should have known that a 
potential conflict existed it was incumbent upon him to make an 
inquiry into the co-defendant's awareness of the conflict, and 
whether or not they were willing to waive their right to conflict 
free representation. United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102 (7th 
Cir. 1986), cert, denied 107 S.Ct. 893. Instead, the Judge 
erroneously concluded, from admittedly conflicting and confusing 
testimony, that "both agreed that Mr. Murphy could go ahead and 
represent them." (T. 132). Reversible error occurred when the 
plea of guilty was made without a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
the constitutional right to conflict free representation. "While 
an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a 
proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and 
it would be fitting and appropriate far that determination to 
appear upon the record." Glasser v. United Statesf 315 U.S. 60, 
71, (1942). In the present case, although the trial judge knew or 
should have known that a conflict existed, the record is void of 
any inquiry into the matter. 
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POINT II 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT WAS BURDENED BY AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST 
"The right to conflict free representation extends to plea 
proceedings, including investigation and negotiation." Moore v. 
United States, 950 F.2d 656, 660 (10th Cir. 1991), citing Bridges 
v. United States, 794 F.2d 1189, 1192 (7th Cir. 1986), Osborn v. 
Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 626 (10th Cir. 1988), United States v. 
Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1986). ". . . the validity 
of a guilty plea depends upon a defendant's knowing and voluntary 
choice among alternatives." Moore at 660. 
In the case here before the court, both co-defendants 
were asked by Mr. Murphy in each other's presence "who's narking on 
who?" (T. 85) . The inappropriateness of this question being posed 
to both co-defendant's while in each other's presence should be 
obvious. Clearly one would not feel comfortable admitting their 
desire to "snitch" on the other while they were in the same room 
together. Mr. Murphy should have asked each one individually in 
private about the possibility of testifying against the other. 
Only in this manner could an intelligent ascertation of their 
intentions be made. While it is true that Appellant and his co-
defendant were good friends at that time, even strong friendships 
can wane in the face of a long prison term. 
10 
Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect 
because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from 
doing. . . Generally speaking, a conflict may also 
prevent an attorney from challenging the admission of 
evidence prejudicial to one client but perhaps favorable 
to another, or from arguing at the sentencing hearing the 
relative involvement and culpability of his clients in 
order to minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing 
that of another. Examples can be readily multiplied. 
But in a case of joint representation of conflicting 
interests the evil—it bears repeating—is in what the 
advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, 
not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea 
negotiations and in the sentencing process. 
Holloway. 435 U.S. at 489-90. 
In the present case, due to the conflict, counsel was 
bound to a common defense for both co-defendants at the expense of 
forsaking all other alternatives. 
"When considering cases involving substantial 
disparities of alleged criminality, several courts have 
concluded that a conflict of interest did arise from the 
circumstances of those cases, (citations omitted) These 
decisions recognize that when a substantial disparity of 
evidence or of charges exists, it would be unusual if an 
actual conflict of interest did not also exist. 
Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17, 22 (Colo. 1985). 
Because Mr. Murphy could not pursue plausible strategies 
such as blame shifting or cooperation with the prosecution, he 
labored under an actual conflict in his joint representation of the 
co-defendant's. "The conflict itself demonstrated a denial of the 
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'right to have the effective assistance of counsel'" Sullivan~. 446 
U.S. at 349, quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76. 
Since the Appellant has shown that he was deprived of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel due to the actual conflict 
arising from the joint representation of both himself and his co-
defendant, Judge Cornaby abused his discretion in denying the 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. That decision must therefore be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was deprived of his right to efective assistance of 
counsel under the 6th amendment to the United States Constitution 
and the Constitution of Utah Article I Section 12 to reverse the 
trial courts denial o£, his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
t&r— 
DATED this IO day of December, 1992. 
NICK H. PORTERFIELD 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Appellant to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144, this / o 
day of December, 1992. 
'A 
ADDENDUM A 
SELECTED TRANSCRIPTS OF MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA HEARING 
1 I you first spoke with Mr. Murphy, had you spoken with 
2 Mr. Weaver about the nature of the charges against both of 
3 I you, filed against both of you? 
4 I A No. 
5 J Q Do you recall the conversation that you had with 
6 Mr. Murphy? 
7 I A I recall the first words he said when me and 
8 Phillip walked into his office. 
9 Q Would you state for the Court what those words 
10 were? 
11 I A He asked us who was narking on who. 
12 Q What did you understand on that question? Did you 
13 have an understanding? 
14 I A He wanted us to snitch on somebody. 
15 Q By snitch, do you mean to make a report or 
16 testimony — 
17 J A Against him. 
18 Q — against someone else? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Did you take that to mean he expected one of you 
21 I to testify against the other? 
22 | A I kind of thought that, yes. 
23 I Q Did you ask him what he meant by that? 
24 I A Umm, I believe I did. 
25 | Q And do you recall if he gave you an answer? 
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1 J A I can't recall. 
2 Q Following the first meeting with Mr. Murphy, did 
3 I you express any concern or did you have any concerns about 
4 his representation of you? 
5 A At that time — Wellf from the first time I walked 
6 in there after he said "Who's narking on who," I had my 
7 doubts. But I had no ~ couldn't afford another attorney, 
8 so nothing really I could do* 
9 Q At the time that you first met with Mr. Murphy, 
10 did he indicate to you what he proposed to do with respect 
11 to the defense of your case, presenting a defense against 
12 the charges on you personally as opposed to Mr. Weaver? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Did Mr. Murphy indicate to you that you had the 
15 right to each be represented by counsel, independent 
16 counsel? 
17 A No, never explained that to me, 
18 Q Did Mr. Murphy discuss with you the possibility 
19 that he might be required to represent both of you in a 
20 situation where your testimony might be conflicting? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Did he ask you at any time if it was — if you 
23 were willing to waive any potential conflicts that he might 
24 have — 
25 A No. 
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1 I endured? 
2 1 MR. PORTERFIELD: Objection. That's been asked and 
3 I answered, your Honor. 
4 I THE COURT: Sustain the objection. But it is 
5 cross-examination, and they are allowed to ask them more 
6/ than one way. 
7 I Go ahead. 
8 THE WITNESS: What was the question? 
9 Q (By Mr. Harward) Has there ever been a time 
10 you've known him that you were not friends? 
11 A No. 
12 Q You were charged with one count of possession of 
13 cocaine; correct? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And you ultimately pled guilty to that; correct? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q And you've even been sentenced? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q The day involved of that possession was the 23rd 
20 day of May, 1991; is that correct? 
21 A Yes. 
22 I Q And it arose out of the same situation under which 
23 1 Mr. Elder was charged with two counts; is that correct? 
24 I A Yes. 
25 | Q Were you aware that your charge was actually in a 
62 
r e c a l l liliu h- • i n r o i j o j v a t i o n s ? 
A AD- ««« .^ UL< .n-.: mj , v»'!?, 
Q Tr^ t h a i
 t.-.» n o r e t j m e Yo*7 do r o r a l l ~ r do n o t 
, * «
 ;<: t . O i l y i* 
A About what? 
Q About enter in-3 P'?> >a bargain agreement. 
A He had questi ,,h:. <u: ar ?,J.-- *-n;. a- , 
reservations ab^a- t ho sentencii. j. 
Q One mo:* 
A I think J answered your question, 
Q D.ii| Mr . KM. a express to you reservations about 
thi • oloa bargain .md plea agreement and entering a "quiJly 
' '* whatever reason? 
A Okay- You've asked pjoa bi:rc:<4 •.•. ..-. : y 
^oreemeiit, and, you know, they'ie all dilaterent matters. 
I'.O M von just narrow ~. •• ' • ' -as M M i.or me t 
answer. 
Q ()]• ,.y . , •'d xoress to v^u reservation? 
Before entering the nui Ji.y pha-, on the 9th, aai ,ie express 
a ioout doing so? 
A Yes, he di d. 
Q Thank you. There was a jury call ed thai day, 
— ~n - . .Hire;. 
A Yes, there was. 
Q AIKI i i j i ' i o \MI ' i K iiiHi i, liji i| ifieiici.. i s s u e d , w e r e t h e r e ? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
* h(*ro \^ds ri( w 
> J- 1 *„ . U . ., • h 1! li: EJ d.€ i: !::< : • 
indicate J« ^ itnesses :;hou»d appear that day? 
>t:v I ;U:> i y h» u • ! -< ' . : trial 
M K . HARWARD: Your Honor, counsel i s not a witness and 
should'- • t make commentary. He shou 3 d ask • questi oris. 
THE COURT: 4'ii:U,iin Lin- oLiecti on. 
';M(!I I It' 
discussion with Mr . Elder concerning witnesses lor « s:rial 
ever? 
I 
Q wnen was that discussion? 
A m U ~ discussion was basically since , umm, r • i.ne 
beginning of iry association with Mr. Weaver when we were 
discussing ;JJ aspects o •• -M;->< -. m ^ ;J.< 
called as a witnesses, it's gone on since, then. 
Nothing -further. 
vl
 IARWARD: May I cross-examine, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARWARD: 
•v<iu I d • * .a t«* l *>r 
U ,' I 
C>m.rt a n d t h e r e c o r d when 
i . <i 
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1 A That' s cor -o*"* . 
2 J Q Now, e x p . ^ . . ; he c o n v e r s a t i o n tha t . {:UJK plat;t. i n 
3 Mr. Eldex * t- p r e s e n c e - ^ n c e i n i ^ . a r k i n g . 
4 1 A f t i sci i s s the 
5 possibility i naiKinq, And . d t Mat wi th aJ ] my cl :i ents •' 
6 I w h o 1: la v e :i • ••• tl: la I: \ * a s • :i f 1:1 i e ] i y • :>n :i ] d 
7 like to cooperaLe w u u IVIVJS M* t Sti: ike For ce tl lat tl ley 
8 j could yei, uiiu more iavoLauie treatment from t^o 
9 I prosecutor^ either a reduction or- dismissal - I ;.:i cn a r g e s . 
10 I Q Were you asking Hi. Elder in the presence oi 
11 I h .
 ;\ .-, .-•• :i< J : k :)i i f Ir Weav er 
12 j -\ I probably discussed i1 there was <:ny conflict; 
1 3 ))fd-- . : • - ! . : - •
 t - - i M P •-. , * f f o * .•>•.»!!••::•. f • •:• • - . i = i .• : •. • fy 
14 against the other. And the reason for that would be to 
15 prob - - make some examinations into whether I could represent 
16 both of them* 
17 Q Okay. Sn you were suggesting to Mr. Elder that he 
18 t e s t :i f :i e d a g a i n s t M i: W e a v e r ? 
19 j h^ai. ] was simply trying to do was to explore 
2 0 - * < - 1 i f e :i 11: 1 e r o f 11 i e m 1 i a i I : e e i i t i :i I ] i i 1 g , !: 1: l < E i :i I 
2 1 w o n > : iinve n a a -- : •.•>-«M h a v e W i t h d r a w n . 
22 j But their indication to me was that they would not 
23 I testify one against, she other. 
24 j
 M So d i.d you explores lurthe^ whether ^it.h^r. had a 
25 I aofense which would be antagonis* ;c t- "•:-._. ..L:ic; . 
ct^jv t h e C o m 1 t o a l l o w M r . E l d e r ;c v. I M H U - I V ; h s pie<»- r. nd 
p r o v i d e L • "i ' • " , h I Ii*"1 < -p; *<>• * un i • : - ^ 
d e f e n s e <UI-JE t o r e q u i r e t h< S t a t e * • . i ' s b iu i ;« n E 
1,1
 . • » I'IT*11 M h l f r i M „ 1 0 1 L i i a L k x l i u . u l 
r e : t e f . 
And we thank your Honor again for your patience in 
hearing this matter. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Conns-, I Jo vou \ ,„;• . * ,' 
Ml<. HARWARD: No. Based upon the evidences produced 
« • r;^ ' -i * !•' ;i tlie authorities stated in 
t he memorandii:!:, we respectfully . isk the Court to deny the 
'VUV COURT: x Hor't • lii UK :<<'<:.• t.o say a qi >-ui\. — ,. 
!h>" matter. lt'(- n'pvinus i hat Mr. Murphy was require,; o: 
nitiaily requested '^prcsiu ; -id* : 
Weaver • ' : i satisfied that he ;iK-t v;ith both o1 1 hem, 
-j i - ;.i <x-< -h -f • * • ^ a m e t i m e . 
*"\i ,:'-ii . sometime during those meO. J nqs, ^ui L don't, know 
; \. . . - oause 1 can't li^iu either Mx . Eider or 
Weaver oi ^ i . Murphy tell exact 1 \ now many meet!rigs 
there were or what was diseusseu at each meeting, but 
s omewh ere ear ] y o n : = . ; i i. - • • i i s 11 I e r e w a s 11: i e m a 1 1 e i: 
oi conflict • ! interest, between the two cases discussed. 
- . : - y I:: :> t:l : testi f:i e d t:l; ic t w I: I si I I say 
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• !. ana Mr. Weaver are good friericis, have 
kmv.'ii each o; ncr mort of their 1ivo.s. They worked 
t oq ^ f'ho? N-^ther IM1- f,MrS!T * pfiM ies nav«- T ^f^rroci ^o 
; i . : ' * ' .: . i • i - • 
aoriinst the other IM- They were both present dti UMI ! he 
.ran sac t: 
t ha*: 
v.<1(!Wi) |¥i. = ,,'•*! ] • o do with the sale or the possession 
i cv -lie, on i v i.he possession for the purpose of KU. v;;:ich, 
ol coursef does make quite a difference between a third 
degree felony and two second degree felonies r.na" :-,• - -ler 
war: -Tharqod with, it could have been a potential coni ! \ of 
: »> i
 lt ;j(ji e c u \ ii,;. . : . rpl iy coi lid go ahea : 
represent them. 
1
 "•'•= "• . !•*"'*• - !• • . . ••• aiively v.i gorous 
defense up unti I we qot tine tor the preparation for an 
actual trial date wh i ch was set for January 9th. The file 
reflects that a tr ic. .n;tice Jo: tin, January 9th date was 
niavi - ?»* \>\? {lie* clort <MI t !ic i4tlt oi November, 1991. So 
t . 1 1 . • , ,. - . ; . .- . 
The Court doesn't have any idea when the 
• i> *: ' u i . n • : - i ! . - ' • • . • • - >v »^\
 t M I '>,: n* ; i i ^ e was 
go ] I .J h«-- t • .r'i.ii „ O b v i o u s Jy • >n • in i day t r ia l i iiey a r r i v e d 
o n j a n u a r y 9 t h , Lh"' : .M 'indor-'- 'ood t h a t . uoss i t was a 
mat4 :or of a n e g o t i a t j u . i -ii.o . i eu . i ing o r a t r i a l b e c a u s e 
p. obL uiie L r x a l . Hut - or t h a t pin [josf% Lhi; : c o u r t 
t:aJ r . anout t h ^ t a k i n g .. *- e n a r i i i - r t e 
Lfi . , i ; q <• . •- L i i e . L t ; l. " * t i rj 1 ' i i M * 1 \ u d 
* r a i s e d a: t ha t t. into Tt- u; a 
*
 ;
 o. matter . i.v am \ * >ien : a I • * -n t h e 
oru " l a i m i n q t h ; i:uni J i c t t o demon si *ai« L uhtire 
:-:uuai c o n i l i c*~ . 
And even t». * :J : v. • — i n t h e 
r e s e n t a t i o r . >f t h e e v i d e n c e t o d a y , do no t s e e an a c t u a l 
• a . i • i. , . • 7 (^cognize t h a t i f I found 
.'?-• a c t u a l coni I ict , \ Have t o i i ad t h a t .a •« * ».i: . lf l*^* 
ne r io rma i i ce • xiad 1 c a n ' t f i n d t h o s e t h i n g s 
'i * 
bo x in : 'in j t^ d«*uy no i. ot i on tcj withdraw the 
r which puts us hiicl-* l1, i^' ^ lp:' "ahoro we were sometime 
a- * whicli _L^ a sentencing. once more suggest that we have 
i presentence rep<; . agreeable, COUIISP.IV 
MR. PORTERFIELD: Well, yeah. I wiJ I - I don ' i. see 
ta . - .-; • lative to having a presentence 
report. suppose we can move along .' •>..'-• • . 4 ier 
tlungs may develop U L I ul 1 h i : \ • •:. Horn r . 
THE COURT: Mean i ng wii.it.':' 
MR. PORTERFIEII W^i *],'j/ 'hat a presentence 
r e p o r t is goi n g - »-. < • • T i — „o
 4i^ ,-^  
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